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TJUH Collaboration with The Joint Commission
for Prevention of Wrong Site Surgery
Wrong site surgery (WSS) is such an egregious
mistake that it has been labeled by one National
Quality Forum (NQF) health safety expert
as a “never event.”1 Never events are defined
as occurences that are “of concern to both
the public and healthcare professionals and
providers; clearly identifiable and measurable
(and thus feasible to include in a reporting
system); and of a nature such that the risk
of occurrence is significantly influenced by
the policies and procedures of the healthcare
organization.”2 The effects can be devastating for
both the patient and the surgical team.3 WSSs
are widely considered to be preventable medical
errors, easily derailed by a series of very basic
verification steps.1,3,4 Yet, according to estimates,
the prevalence may be as high as 40 WSS events
per week across the nation.5
When compared to the total number of U.S.
operative cases performed annually, WSSs
are still very rare.1 However, in recent years
the incidence of WSS reported to The Joint
Commission has increased from 15 cases
in 1998 to a total of 956 cases by late 2010
and, because reporting is voluntary, there is
strong speculation that the official number of
actual cases may be grossly underreported.3,6
Regardless of the cause of the trend WSSs
remain a devastating and potentially costly
problem within the surgical setting.1
The issue of WSS errors is not new. Prior to the
release of the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM)
report To Err Is Human, there was no process
for recognizing, reporting and tracking injuries
and near misses in the surgical setting.3 As
such, surgeons were largely unaware of the
widespread nature of this issue.3 Following
the release of the IOM report, a 2003 Joint
Commission summit brought together a multidisciplinary team of health care professionals
to examine and address the scope of WSS.3,5
Their work led to the creation of a protocol, The
Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site,
Wrong Procedure, and Wrong Person Surgery.3,5

Rooted in prevention theories derived in high-risk
industries like aviation and nuclear weaponry, the
Universal Protocol outlines three key elements for
systems change to prevent WSS.3
1. Pre-operative verification
2. Marking the operative site
3. Taking a time-out
In 2009, The Joint Commission charged its newly
formed Center for Transforming Healthcare
with the task of addressing the problem of WSS.5
Thomas Jefferson University and Hospitals
(TJUH) was one of eight organizations that
agreed to participate in a WSS project. The
Jefferson organization has 57 operating rooms
across all campuses, and performed over 38,000
surgical procedures last fiscal year.

After building a team and identifying key
stakeholders, TJUH members set about
initiating processes to measure inconsistencies
and variations from policies, standards, and
standard operating procedures. The team quickly
discovered opportunities for improvement during
the scheduling phase, including incomplete
paperwork, illegible writing, and missing
documentation. Within the actual operating room
suites, the team observed that not all surgical
team members were actively engaged in the
time-out process. It was also noted that some site
markings tended to fade after the application of
the surgical scrub. In all of the areas, the team
noted staff members appeared to be rushed to
complete all tasks prior to the start of the surgical
procedure. The findings at TJUH very closely
mirrored the common contributions to errors
found in a much larger 2007 state wide study
performed by Clarke, Johnston and Finley.7

The Wrong Site Surgery project is designed
to address the problem using Robust Process
Improvement (RPI) methods.5 RPI is a factbased, systematic, and data-driven problemsolving methodology that incorporates tools
and methods from both the Lean Six Sigma
and change management methodologies.5
Lean Six Sigma is a business methodology
that aims to eliminate variation in product by
employing lessons learned the manufacturing
setting. Using RPI, the project teams measure
the magnitude of the problem (or in the case of
WSS, the specific problems that increase the risk
of this event), pinpoint the contributing causes,
develop specific solutions that are targeted
to each cause, and then thoroughly test the
solutions in real life situations.5

Following an examination of their findings, the
TJUH team instituted several significant changes
within the study areas. To improve the accuracy
of the scheduling process, fax numbers were
consolidated and a process was created to notify
physician offices prior to the day of surgery when
primary documents were missing. The team
also redesigned the scheduling form to eliminate
unnecessary or irrelevant fields. As a result of
these changes, the proportion of variation in the
scheduling area improved from 77% to 35%.
The rates were calculated using data obtained
from baseline audits compared to post solutions
implementation. The data was submitted to the
Center for Transforming Healthcare and entered
into the electronic program.

The TJUH project focused on Orthopedic
services. Because of the laterality that is inherent
in these procedures, Orthopedics ranks nationally
among the top five service lines in which WSSs
most commonly occur.3 At TJUH, every step in
the process of scheduling and preparing a patient
for surgery was reviewed to identify potential
variations that could lead to errors.

In the pre-operative holding area, the surgical
marker was changed to one that would not be
removed by the operative site preparatory scrub.
Education was provided to the staff to reinforce
the importance of verifying the patient’s identity
and comparing their verbalized information
against the signed surgical consent. Lastly, the
team mandated that all regional blocks performed
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by anesthesia personnel have both a formal preprocedure time-out and a standard site marking.
As a result of these revised processes, the rate of
variation was reduced from 73% to 12%.
Processes in the operating room suites were
revised to include the implementation of a rolebased time-out. The role-based time-out and the
development of a surgical safety checklist (based
on the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist) engages
the entire surgical team and ensures their active
participation in the time out process. The TJUH
team also devised and implemented a modified
staffing model for the orthopedic service, which
included an increase from two to three staff
members assigned for most rooms. This addition

was a direct result of the findings of a preassessment nursing survey which identified that
nurses felt rushed when setting up the cases. As a
result of these process changes, the rate of variation
was reduced from 68% to 48%.
Collaborating with the Joint Commission Center for
Transforming Healthcare in the Wrong Site Surgery
initiative was an excellent opportunity to learn
from other health care organizations throughout
the country. The engagement provided hospital
leadership with tools to improve current processes
and measure improvement. The project results were
shared with the hospital community at large and
support the TJUH mission of providing safe, quality
healthcare to our patients. 
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